UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-1-2009

Funes v. Aardema Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35923

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Funes v. Aardema Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35923" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2576.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2576

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

1
1

PILADELFO M. FUNES,
ClaimantIAppellant,

v.
)

AARDEMA DAIRY, Employer, and
STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety,

Docket No. 35923-2008

.

.-

DefendantsKespondents.

.

..

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Chairman James E. Kile Presiding

Emil F. Pike, Jr.
AT LAW
ATTORNEY
P.0. BOX302
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0302
Telephone: 20819960
Facsimile: 2081734-9960
Attorneyfor Claimant/Appellant

Neil D. McFeeley
EBERLE,BERLIN,KADING,TURNBOW
&
MCKLVEEN,
CHTD.
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-8535
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542
Attorneysfor Defendants/Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
A. Nature of the Case.................................................................................................................

1

B. Course of Proceedings Below. .............................................................................................. 2
C. Statement of Facts. ................................................................................................................ 2
11. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................ 10
111. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 10
A. Standard of Review. ........................................................................................................... 10
B. The Industrial Commission's Finding that the Claimant Was Not Totally
and Permanently Disabled Is Supported by Substantial and Competent
Evidence in the Record ..................................................................................................... 13
C. The Industrial Commission's Finding that the Claimant Was Not an Odd
Lott Worker Is Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence in the
Record ...............................................................................................................................

13

D. Substantial and Competent Evidence Supports the Industrial Commission's
Finding that the Claimant Was Entitled to a Permanent Partial Disability
Rating of 25% of the Whole Person. ................................................................................ 15

E. Defendants Are Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees. ................................................... 19
IV. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................... 20

RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF - i
78009-3 151178788

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Anderson v. Harper's Inc., I43 Idaho 193, 195, 141 P.3d 1062, 1064
15
(2006) ........................................................................................................................................

Baldner v. Bennettt, 103 Idaho 458, 649 P.2d 1214 (1982) .......................................................... 15
Bennett v. Clark Hereford Ranch, '106 Idaho 438,440,680 P.2d 539,541
15
(1984) .........................................................................................................................................

Boley v. State, 130 Idaho 278, 281, 939 P.2d 854, 856 (1997)................................................. 13,14
Huerta v. School District No. 431, 116 Idaho 43,47,773 P.2d 1130, 1134
14
(1989) .........................................................................................................................................

Houser v. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441,445,649
P.2d 1197, 1201 (1982) .............................................................................................................. 16

Jawis v. Rexburg Nursing Center, 136 Idaho 579,583,38 P.3d 617,621
Langley v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781,784,
890 P.2d 732, 735 (1995) ........................................................................................................... 11

McCabe v. JoAnn Stores, Inc., 145 Idaho 91, 95, 175 P.3d 170, 184 (2007) ...................... 15,16,17
McGee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 142 Idaho 761, 133 P.3d 1226
13
(2006) ........................................................................................................................................

Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759 (1996) ............................................................. 16
Pomerinke v. Excel Trucking Transport, 124 Idaho 301,305,859 P.2d
337, 341 (1993).......................................................................................................................... 18

Seese v. Ideal ofIdaho, Inc., 110 Idaho 32, 714 P.2d 1 (1985) ................................................. 16
Smith v. Payette County, 105 Idaho 618, 622, 671 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1983) ................................. 16
Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 47-48, 156 P.3d 545, 549-50 (2007) ..................................... 11,19
Sykes v. C.P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761, 764, 604 P.2d 939, 934 (1980) .................................. 16

RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF - ii
78009-3151178788

Swanson v. K d . Inc.. 116 Idaho 3 15. 3 19. 775 P.2d 629. 633 (1989) ........................................ 17
Talbot v. Ames Construction. 127 Idaho 648.649-50. 904 P.2d 560.56 111,12,19
62 (1995) ..........................................................................................................................

Thompson v. Motel 6. 135 Idaho 373, 376, 17 P.3d 874, 877 (2001)............................................
14

Zapata v.J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 5 13,516, 975 P.2d 1178, 1181
(1991) .........................................................................................................................................

17

Statutes:

Idaho Code $72-102(11) ................................................................................................................
16
Idaho Code $72-425.................................................................................................................. 13,16
Idaho Code $72-430............................................................................................................. 13,16,17
Idaho Code $72-506............................................................................................................... :....1,17
Idaho Code $72-732....................................................................................................................... 11

Other Authorities:

.

.Idaho Const Art . V. SIX................................................................................................................ 11

Rules:

Idaho Appellate Rule 11.1 ................................................................................................... 10.19.20

RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF .
ii
78009-3151178788

I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
Respondents Aardema Dairy, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety (hereinafter

"the Defendants") note that Appellant Filadelfo M. Funes (hereinafter "Claimant") failed to
provide a Statement of the Nature of the Case or Statement of the Course of Proceedings Below.
Defendants submit that this case involves an appeal from a well-supported decision of the
Industrial Commission which awarded the Claimant substantial workers' compensation benefits.
The issue before this Court is whether Claimant can bear his burden of proving that the Industrial
Commission's decision was not based upon substantial competent evidence. Claimant is
objecting to the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission, which findings are subject to
limited appellate review.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
The hearing on this matter was conducted on December 14, 2007 before Referee Michael

E. Powers. On August 1,2008, Referee Powers filed his "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommendation." By Order dated August 12, 2008, the Industrial Commission approved,
confirmed, and adopted the Referee's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
pursuant to Idaho Code 572-506 and ordered that Defendants pay certain medical bills, attorney
fees, and benefits for a 25% Whole Person Permanent Partial Disability award. Defendants paid
those benefits. Claimant moved for reconsideration of the factual findings by the Commission on
September 4, 2008, but that motion was denied by Order of the Industrial Commission dated
October 21, 2008. Claimant then timely filed this appeal.
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C.

Statement of the Facts.
The Commission's Findings of Fact (Agency Record ("R) pp. 10-21) are complete and

accurate. Based upon the evidence received at the hearing, the Industrial Commission concluded
that the Claimant was entitled to a Permanent Partial Impairment rating of 10% as specified by
Dr. Verst, (R. p. 26), found that the Claimant had not proven that he was totally and permanently
disabled, (id., pp. 27-28), and found that the Claimant had a permanent partial disability rating of
25%, inclusive of the impairment rating.

(Id., p. 3 and p. 34).

Claimant moved for

reconsideration, (id. pp. 46-53), but the Industrial Commission denied Claimant's motion, noting
that it "amounts to a request to re-weigh evidence and arguments already considered." (Id., p.
62). Claimant's Statement of Facts ignores many of the findings of the Commission. Those
omitted facts will be discussed below.
Before coming to the United States, the Claimant drove a taxi andlor a truck for 15 years
since he was 18 years old. (Reporter's Transcript ("TR") p. 21). There was no indication that
these jobs required any type of heavy lifting or any physical exertion. The Claimant has an
Idaho drivers' license. (TR p. 62). The Claimant came to the United States in 1997, but
allegedly has not learned any English in the ten years he lived in the United States. (Id., p. 60).
After obtaining work authorization in 1998, the Claimant worked in the assembly line at Rite
Stuff Foods and then began his career doing dairy work, either milking or herding or driving.

id^, pp. 24,32). At the time of injury, the Claimant did quite a bit of driving, and also picked up
calves. He had to keep track of these transactions and accordingly was required to and did keep
records. (Id., pp. 65-66).
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While working at the Employer in January 2005, he suffered an industrial injury when he
was picking up a newborn calf and allegedly another newborn calf struck him in the left hip. (Id., p.
32). He claims that this caused him to feel that "something just exploded in my head." (Id.).
Despite these alleged problems, Claimant did not seek medical care for two days. He saw
Dr. Thomas Zepeda at St. Benedict's Medical Center on February 1,2005 and told Dr. Zepeda that
he had low back pain as a result of picking up a calf. (R, Claimant's Exhibit ("Clmt.'~ EX.")^).
Claimant underwent conservative treatment and was referred to Dr. David Verst, a spine
surgeon, on March 16, 2005. Dr. Verst diagnosed an "uncomplicated" low back herniated nucleus
pulposus based on the MRI report. (R., Defendants' Exhibit ("Defs.' Ex.") 3, p. 5). When
conservative care did not resolve Claimant's complaints, Dr. Verst performed surgery on May 2,
2005. (R., Defs.' Ex. 3, p. 13). Surgery was a far lateral diskectomy at L5-S1, and the Operative
Report noted "underlying degenerative disk disease at the L5-S1 level." The report also noted that
the surgery went well and the "foramen was fully free, with no evidence of nerve root compression."
Claimant was discharged on the same day. (Id. at 3, p. 15).
Claimant apparently had a different understanding than did Dr. Verst about the surgery. He
testified that the "surgery wasn't done right. The doctor also explained this to me that when they did
the surgery, they split the nerves. When they closed me up after the surgery, they didn't reconnect
the nerves. They just left them one on top of another

. . . . The doctor didn't cut part of the nerves

that were sticking out, part of the nerves that were hitting the nerve that goes down to my leg." (TR,
pp. 39 and 38). Objective testing, however, shows that the surgery was successful.
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By June 2,2005, a month after the surgery, the Claimant's pain had diminished and he had
"marked functional improvement." (R., Defs.' Ex. 3, p. 18). Dr. Verst released him to return to
work with restrictions by June 27, 2005 and planned to release him to return to work without
restrictions after four weeks of physical therapy. (Id., pp. 3 and 20).
The Employer provided light-duty work within Dr. Verst's restrictions, having the Claimant
drive a water truck which travels less than one mile per hour. On the f ~ sday,
t the Claimant did not
even drive for the four-hour shift Dr. Verst had allowed, and on the second day, the Claimant lefr
work before his four-hour shifr ended. He contended that he was in severe pain and that his back
was swollen. (TR pp. 45-46). He stated that he retuned to Dr. Verst two days later and Dr. Verst
told him he could not work anymore. ( I ) Once again, Dr. Verst's chart notes and testimony are
directly to the contrary. His chart note of July 21,2005 states nothing regarding any swelling in the
Claimant's back and specifically states that the Claimant should continue working within his
restrictions four hours a day. (R., Defs.' Ex. 3, p. 22 and R, Depo. of David Verst, M.D. ("Verst
Depo."), p. 27). Dr. Verst testified that the Claimant did not have any swelling in his back when he
saw him two days after the Claimant attempted the light-duty work at the Employer and also
testified that he never told the Claimant that he should not go back to work. (Id.,p. 27).
Dr. Verst could find nothing objectively wrong with the Claimant following the surgery
other than the subjective complaints. He referred the Claimant to Dr. Clinton Dill6 in November of
2005 for epidural steroid injections. Dr. Dill6 noted that Claimant's symptoms appear "to be greatly
exaggerated." (R., Defs.' Ex. 5, p. 3). Dr. Verst then referred the Claimant to Dr. Wiggins for pain
management because of the Claimant's continuing complaints. Dr. Verst concluded on February 18,
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2006 that the Claimant was medically stable and had a 10% impairment rating, which was based on
the herniated disk, the surgery and the continued subjective complaints of pain. (R., Defs.' Ex. 3, p.
30; R., Verst Depo. p. 14:13-18).
The Claimant saw Dr. Wiggins for the first time on March 8, 2006, and she noted that he
demonstrated "regionalization and pain behaviors."

(R., Clmt.'~. Ex. 6).

She prescribed

medications and scheduled him for follow-up treatment. On March 30, 2006, on only her second
dealing with the Claimant, she began to notice,"some symptom magnification." (Id. on 3/30/06
chart note). She noted that while he ambulated slowly into the examination room with a cane, "he
did ambulate a little bit faster after leaving my office when not conscious of being observed." (Id.).
She continued conservative treatment, including attempting physical therapy, and continued to
prescribe medications. (Id. at 4/27/06 chart note). However, she noted that the Claimant would or
could not cooperate with the physical therapist. By May 25, 2006, Dr. Wiggins' suspicions were
growing. She noted his multiple complaints, including symptoms like "ants walking on and biting
his legs" as well as new knee problems. (Id. at 5/25/06 chart note). Her impression was as follows:
At this point, I honestly do not know what is going on with Mr.
Funes. His complaints continue to increase in number. He does not
tolerate examination of even superficial palpation. His MRI only
shows a significant straighteningbf the ceAiEal lordosis along with
disc protrusion at C4-5 that contacts the cervical cord. Unfortunately,
this does not correspond with any of the complaints that he tells me
about.

(Id.).
She suggested an Independent Medical Examination ("IME)as she had no idea whether the
Claimant had a real problem. On August 16, 2006 she noted that he had "migratory areas of
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multiple pain that are obviously not all related to his initial low back injury." (Id. at 8/16/06 note).
On November 14,2006, in response to a request from the Claimant's attorney, she confessed that '7
do have some concerns due to the migratory nature of his pain and the fact that some of his
symptoms quite frankly do not make sense. Also, I am quite concerned that I am not getting
complete cooperation on physical examinations from Mr. Funes." (Id. at 11/14/06 letter).
The Claimant returned to Dr. Wiggins on February 7,2007. She noted that "he is tender to
palpation to the point of staggering and almost falling. This is even to very light touch." (Id. at
2/7/07 note). She noted on her examination of the upper extremities that "this examination was not
very usekl as there was obvious fictitious breakaway strength even with minimal resistance from
me. He also demonstrated variable strength in muscles although nothing represented a maximal
effort in my opinion." She noted that "Mr. Funes' exam is extremely difficult to interpret as there
are many obvious fictitious elements." Her impression was:

Mr. Funes has an aching back pain. Unfortunately, I do have
difficulty assessing the true extent of these limitations due to some
malingering on the physical examination. At this point, I think that
he is at MMI. I believe some of his, back and neck pain come from
his original injury, although I don't think that he has significant
limitations as a result. He also has had West Nile virus which is at
least partly responsible for some of his symptoms as well.
She then awarded him a 12% impairment rating for the lumbar spine injury and released the
Claimant. (Id.).
Because of Dr. Verst's and Dr. Wiggins' inability to find any objective problems with the
Claimant despite his continuing and increasingly widespread and bizarre pain complaints, and based
on their suggestions that an IME be undertaken, the Defendants commissioned an Independent
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Medical Examination with orthopedic surgeon Joseph Daines, M.D., psychiatrist Eric Holt, M.D.,
and neurologist Richard Wilson, M.D., on April 12,2007. (R., Defs.' Ex. 6). Dr. Holt's psychiatric
evaluation concluded that the Claimant was "exaggerating his pain symptoms in a nalve and
unsophisticated manner and is attempting to portray himself as an invalid so that he would have
secondary gain, i.e., qualify for Social Security Disability." (Id. p. 15). The Panel as a whole
examined the Claimant and noted the claim of symptoms from his forehead and right eye down his
back through his leg. He manifested prominent pain behavior, and had some muscle tenderness but
no involuntary muscle spasm. (Id., p. 6). The Panel concluded as follows:
Mr. Funes likely sustained a far right lateral L5-S1 intervertebral disk
herniation as a result of his work injury of 1/29/05. He is now status
post right L5-S1 laminectomy and diskectomy. He has persistent,
atypical low back pain with grossly over-determined pain behavior
on examination and diminished sensation and giveaway weakness in
his right leg and mild anatomic/physiologic pattern. His postoperative diagnostic workup has not shown any evidence of recurrent
lumbar disk herniation nor does his diagnostic workup or current
examination support objective evidence for his persistent back and
right leg complaints.

(Id., p. 7).
The Panel noted the Claimant had somewhat bizarre symptoms in his head and behind his
eye but had no anatomical or physiologic findings to explain these. The Panel stated these upper
back complaints were not the result of injury and had no viable medical explanation. It stated that
the Claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and agreed with Dr. Verst's 10%
impairment rating. It stated that Claimant would qualify for light to medium work activities with
lifting limited to 50 pounds, 25 pounds on a regular basis, and limited stooping and bending. It

stated that no further medical treatment was indicated and that Claimant's abilities "may likely
improve following settlement of his workmens compensation claim." It agreed with Dr. Verst that
this claim should be brought to closure. (Id., p. 8). Dr. Verst concurred with the Panel's
conclusions. (R., Defs.' Ex. 3, p. 35).
At the Hearing, the Claimant admitted that he had not applied for jobs or attempted work
since the accident, other than the two partial days of light-duty work supplied by his Employer. (TR
pp. 83-84 and 127).
At the hearing, Greg Taylor, Field Consultant for the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation
Division, testified. On direct examination he supported some of Claimant's arguments that he had
disability above impairment, but on cross-examination, Mr. Taylor admitted that the major reason
Claimant was not able to find work was because he believed himself to be disabled. (TR pp. 13132). Mr. Taylor admitted that under Dr. Verst's restrictions there were jobs available to the

Claimant. (TR pp. 110-1 1). He admitted that there are jobs available that Claimant would have the
physical capability to do based on Dr. Verst's limitations and that most 49 year olds generally do not
have jobs lifting over 50 pounds anyway. (Id., p. 112). He acknowledged that the Claimant could
most likely return to driving a truck or taxi or farm vehicles. He acknowledged that no physician
had stated the Claimant could not perform the water tractor driving job that he had been given after
the accident. (Id., pp. 115-16). He acknowledged that the Claimant under Dr. Verst's restrictions
would also be able to perform the otherjob offered by the Employer inspecting calves. (ILd., pp. 11617).

Mr. Taylor acknowledged that under the IME Panel's restrictions, ivith which Dr. Verst
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agreed, the labor market was even more open to the Claimant. (Id., p. 120). He noted a number of
different types of jobs, including many jobs available for Spanish-speaking individuals. (Id., pp.
121-23). He also acknowledged in response to the Referee's questions that there was nothing
physically that would prevent the Claimant from obtaining a commercial driver's license. (Id., pp.
130-31).
The deposition of Dr. Verst, the Claimant's treating surgeon, was taken on January 2 1,2008
and his testimony is quite revealing. Discussing his treatment of the Claimant, he stated that the
surgery on May 2,2005 was only an outpatient surgery which went well with no complications and
was "executed well with decompressing the L5 nerve root." (R., Verst Depo., p. 9). He also stated
that he found underlying degenerative disk disease which was pre-existing and was not caused by
the accident, and that the pre-existing disk disease was causing at least some of the symptoms and
restrictions. (Id., pp. 8-9). He noted the Claimant had marked physical improvement after the
surgery and was released to light-duty work after June 27,2005, starting with four hours a day and
then progressing to eight hours a day. (Id,, p. 11). He testified there were no objective reasons why
the Claimant should not have been able to perform the four hours' work at the Employer and that he
could continue working.
Dr. Verst discussed Claimant's 10% impairment rating, and emphasized that he had
considered the pain complaints and had not underestimated the percent of impairment. (Id., pp. 1415). He testified that his comments regarding the "linlited job opportunities" for the Claimant were
based on Claimant's belief that he could not return to work, not Dr. Verst's belief or the objective
signs. ( I d p 16). As a matter of fact, he explained that the Claimant had "an unusual,
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disproportionate amount of pain and what made it more complex was that the pain was 'atypical' in
the sense that it did not follow a particular dermatomal pattern, meaning it didn't follow a specific
nerve root." He stated there was no consistency with the pain and that there were no objective
findings "that substantiated his subjective complaints." (Id., pp. 17-18). He said any pain the
Claimant was actually suffering could very we11 be related to the underlying degenerative disk
disease and that there were no real lifting or activity restrictions based solely on the industrial
accident and surgery. (Id.).
Dr. Verst stated that he had an MRI performed because he could find no objective reason for
Claimant's complaints. He stated the MRI was negative for nerve root compression, although there
was multi-level disk degeneration involving both the cervical and lumbar spine which was not
caused by the industrial accident. (Id., p. 19).
Dr. Verst stated that he did agree with the findings of the IME Panel as well as those of Dr.
Wiggins, who both commented on the rather bizarre symptoms and the fictitious elements exhibited
by the Claimant. (Id., pp. 21-24). He also stated that he believed the Claimant could return to the
work he was doing prior to the time of injury. (Id., p. 25). He testified that he disagreed with Dr.
O'Brien's impairment rating and the limitations suggested. (Id., p. 26).
11.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Are Defendants entitled to an award of attorney fees based on Rule 11.1, Idaho Appellate
Rules, as Claimant's counsel simply asks the Supreme Court to re-weigh the evidence?
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111.

A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the black letter law on its scope of review

of a decision of the Industrial Commission:

When reviewing a decision of the Industria1 Commission, this Court
exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of
fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence
supports the Commission's findings. Neihart v. UniversalJoint Auto
Parts, Inc., 141 Idaho 801, 803, 118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005).
Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant" evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Id., quoting
Boise Orthopedic Cliizic v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 128 Idaho 161,
164, 911 P.2d 754, 757 (1996). It is more than a scintilla of proof,
but less than a preponderance. Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho
406, 412, I8 P.3d 21 1, 217 (2000). All facts and inferences will be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before
the Industrial Commission and the Commission's conclusions
regarding credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed
unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Neihart, 141 Idaho at
802-03,118 P.3d at 134-135.

Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44,47-48,156 P.3d 545,549-50 (2007).
The scope of review is firmly established in the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho Code, and case
law. On appeal, this Court's review of the decision fiom the Industrial Commission is limited to
questions of law. Idaho Const Art. V, $LX; LC. 572-732; Langley v. Idaho Industrial Special

Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781,784,890 P.2d 732,735 (1995); Talbot v. Ames Consbuction, 127
Idaho 648, 649-50,904 P.2d 560,561-62 (1995). "The law is well established that this Court does
not scrutinize the weight and credibility of the evidence relied upon by the Commission and will

-
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only disturb the Commission's findings as to weight and credibility if they are clearly erroneous."

Talbot, 127 Idaho at 650,904 P.2d at 562. Idaho Code 572-732 provides that the Court may only set
aside an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission if the Commission's findings of fact are not based
on any substantial competent evidence, the Commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of its powers, the order was procured by fraud, or the findings of fact do not as a matter of law
support the order or award.
The Court in the Talbot case made the following observations which are equally applicable
to the present circumstance:
On appeal, Talbot requests this Court to reconsider the testimony and
evidence and to call into question and review the credibility
determinations of the Commission. In addition, Talbot asks this
Court to reconsider the testimony from one of Talbot's physicians
and to engage in reweighing of the facts, contrary to the long
established rule that this Court does not reweigh the findings of the
Commission. Talbot essentially invites this Court to depart from the
long standing and traditional scope of reviewing a decision from the
Industrial Commission, as required by the Constitution, statutes, and
a long line of case law, and review de novo the findings and
credibility determinations of the Commission. No argument is made
by Talbot that the Commission's findings are not supported by
substantial, competent evidence in the record. In fact, at oral
argument before this Court, the attorney for Talbot admitted without
exception that the record contains substantial, competent evidence to
support the Commission's findings. Additionally, no argument was
made that the Commission's findings are clearly erroneous, that the
conclusions are not supported by the findings, or that the
Commission committed error as a matter of law. Talbot's single
argument on appeal is a plea to this Court to call into question and
review anew the fmdiings of the Commission in the hope that this
Court might come to a different conclusion than that of the
Commission. This Court will not abandon established precedent and
may not ignore the express directive of the Idaho Constitution and the
Idaho Code. We will review the findings of the Commission on the
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exclusive basis of determining whether the findings are supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record. Langley, 126 Idaho
at 784,890 P.2d at 735; Roberts, 124 Idaho at 947,866 P.2d at 970.

Talbot, 127 Idaho at 650,904 P.2d at 562.
B.

The Industrial Commission's Finding that the Claimant Was Not Totally and
Permanently Disabled Is Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence in the
Record.
Claimant asserts on his "Issues on Appeal" that the Commission committed error in its

failure to find that he was totally and permanently disabled or to find that he was classified as an
Odd Lot worker, but does not support either issue in his briefing other than to assert that the
Claimant is an Odd Lot worker. When the Court reviews the Commission's fmdings of fact on total
disability (R. pp, 27-28), it will recognize that the Commission's findings are supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
Whether a claimant is totally and permanently disabled is a question of fact. Boley v. State,
130 Idaho 278, 281, 939 P.2d 854, 856 (1997). In determining whether a claimant has met his
burden of proving 100% disability, the Commission considers the nature of the injury, the claimant's
age at the time of the accident, his occupation, his education level and his ability to work. LC. $72430. The primary focus when evaluating disability is the effect these factors have on the claimant's
"present and probable m r e ability to engage in gainful employment." LC. $72-425; Jawis v.

Rexburg Nursing Center, 136 Idaho 579,583,38 P.3d 617,621 (2001); McGee v. Thompson Creek
Mining Co., 142 Idaho 761, 133 P.3d 1226 (2006). The only "evidence" that Claimant presented to
the Commission is his testimony that he does not think that he can work, and the testimony of
physicians and Mr. Taylor of ICRD that the Claimant told them he does not think he can work. This
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does not carry his burden of proving total disability, and he makes no additional argument in his
brief to this Court.
C.

The Industrial Commission's Finding that the Claimant was Not an Odd Lot Worker
Is Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence in the Record.
At the Commission level, the Claimant bears the burden of proving of prima facie case for

Odd Lot status. Boley, 130 Idaho at 281, 939 P.2d at 857. Aprimafacie case of Odd Lot status is
only established "if the evidence is undisputed and is reasonably susceptible to only one
interpretation." Thompson v. Motel 6,135 Idaho 373,376, 17 P.3d 874,877 (2001).
Claimant has not borne his burden of establishing a prima facie case of odd-lot status by
proving the unavailability of suitable work. Huerta v. School District No. 431, 116 Idaho 43,47,
773 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1989). He must do more than assert that he cannot perform his previous type
of employment. Id. at 49,773 P.2d at 1136. Claimant did not even establish that he could not return
to his previous employment, as Dr. Verst has stated that he could do so.

In order to cany his burden, the Claimant could have shown what other types of employment
he had attempted; shown that vocational counselors or employment agencies or the Job Service had
searched for other work and that such work was not available; or shown that any efforts to find
suitable employment would have been futile. Huerta at 48,773 P.2d at 1135. As to the first factor,
the evidence clearly established that Clainiant had not attempted other work for two and a half years.
He did not show that any employment counselors had searched for work for him and that such work
was not available. Mr. Taylor admitted that he had never searched for work for the Claimant since
the Claimant had told him that he was not able to work. Finally, the Claimant did not show that any
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efforts to find suitable employment would have been futile, as all of his physicians allowed him to
return to work and his treating physicians and the IME Panel allowed him to return, if not to his preinjury work, at least to the work that he was assigned after surgery. Moreover, he had not attempted
to find any jobs in the driving industry, even though he has at least 15 years of experience and his
physical limitations would not preclude him from driving. Claimant has not shown medical inability
to engage in gainful activities. See Baldner v. Bennett, 103 Idaho 458, 649 P.2d 1214 (1982). He
received medical approval to retum to work. Dr. Verst stated that, from an objective point of view,
the Claimant could retum to the work he was doing prior to the time of injury. (R., Verst Depo. at
25). The Commission's decision that Claimant did not prove he was an Odd Lot worker is
supported by substantial and competent evidence.
D.

Substantial and Competent Evidence Supports the Industrial Commission's Finding
that the Claimant Was Entitled to a Permanent Partial Disability Rating of 25% of the
Whole Person.
The degree of permanent disability resulting from an industrial injury is a question of fact.

McCabe v. JoAnn Stores, Inc., 145 Idaho 91,95, 175 P.3d 170, 184 (2007); Anderson v. Harper's,
Inc., 143 Idaho 193,195, I41 P.3d 1062,1064 (2006). Here, as in McCabe, Claimant's assertions of
error in determining permanent disability are in reality a challenge to the Commission's weighing of
evidence. "It is a claimant who must bear the burden of proof in establishing that she is disabled in
excess of impairment." McCabe, 145 Idaho at 96, 175 P.3d 780 at 785; Bennett v. Clark Hereford

Ranch, 106 Idaho 438, 440, 680 P.2d 539, 541 (1984). Thus, the question before this Court is
whether the Commission's determination that Claimant failed to carry his burden of proving that he
was disabled in excess of 25% is supported by the factual record. Here, as in McCabe, "Because the
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record indicates that [the Claimant] failed to produce any substantial evidence bearing on [bis]
disability in excess of impairment," the Court should affirm the order of the Commission. Id. at 96,
175 P.3d at 785.

A claimant seeking compensation has the burden of proving a compensable disablement
under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759
(1996). Proof must be in the form of expert medical evidence on the extent of any disability. The
burden of proof always rests on the claimant. Sykes v. C.P. Clare & Co., 100 Idaho 761,764,604
P.2d 939, 943 (1980). Claimant here presented no proof, much less expert medical or vocational
proof, that he was entitled to disability above his 10% impairment. See, e.g., Houser v. Southern

Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441,445, 649 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1982). Idaho Code 572-425
provides that the evaluation or rating of permanent disability is "an appraisal of the injured
employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity, as it is affected by the
medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent non-medical factors [such as age, sex,
education, economic and social environment] as provided in $72-430, LC." Under the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Law, "disability" is defined as a "decrease in wage earning capacity due to
injury or occupational disease, as such capacity is affected by the medical factor of physical
impairment, and by pertinent non-medical factors." LC. $72-102(11). The'burden of proof is
always on the Claimant to prove disability in excess of his impairment rating. Seese v. Ideal of

Idaho, Inc., 110 Idaho 32,714 P.2d 1 (1985).
"Where a claimant has produced no significant evidence in the record which bears on a
disability in excess of the permanent impairment rating, an additional award in excess of the
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impairment may not be sustained. Smith v. Payette County, 105 Idaho 618, 622, 671 P.2d 1081,
1085 (1983)." McCabe, supra at 96,175 P.3d at 785.
The Commission need not make detailed findings on every fragment of evidence regarding
degree of disability submitted to it. Swanson v. KraJ2, Inc., 116 Idaho 315,319,775 P.2d 629,633
(1989). As this Court stated in McCabe, "It is apparent from the record that the Commission
considered the non-medical factors set forth in LC. $72-430 as they affected [the Claimant's] ability
to engage in gainkl activity. As permitted by LC. $72-506, the Commission adopted the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the Referee as its own. By doing so, the
Commission adopted the Referee's findings regarding the essential LC. $72-430 non-medical factors
addressed therein. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 516, 975 P.2d 1178, 1181 (1991).
These findings included, inter alia, [the Claimant's] age, educational background, empIoyment
history, employment history, occupation at the time of injury, nature of the injury, subsequent
impairment, work limitations, post-injury labor market analysis, and her personal and economic
circumstances." McCabe, 145 Idaho at 99, 175 P.3d at 788. In the present case, the evidence and
the testimony of Dr. Verst in his post-hearing deposition and the testimony of Mr. Taylor of the
Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division are relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion. Zapata, 132 Idaho at 516, 975 P.2d at 1181. Claimant here failed to
provide any evidence from a vocational analyst or a physician to carry his burden of proving that he
was disabled more than the 25% disability awarded by the Commission.
"A determination by the Commission as to the degree of permanent disability resulting from

an industrial injury is a factual question committed to the particular expertise of the Commission."
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McCabe, 145 Idaho at 99,175 P.3d at 788; Zapata, 132 Idaho at 5 16,975 P.2d at 1181. "The Court

cannot re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have drawn a different conclusion from
the evidence presented unless it is clearly erroneous." McCabe, 145 Idaho at 99, 175 P.3d at 788.
The Commission in the present case did not err as a matter of law and its decision is not clearly
erroneous. Claimant's physicians and the Independent Medical Examination Panel have all stated
that the Claimant could (and should) return to work. Mr. Taylor of ICRD provided a labor market
analysis showing that under the restrictions imposed by Dr. Verst, Dr. Wiggins, and the IME panel,
the Claimant did have significant employment opportunities which would allow him to earn wages
at a pre-injury status or close thereto. The Commission's finding is supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
The only claim that the Claimant makes to this Court is that the Industrial Commission
"ignored" evidence showing that the Claimant suffered &om chronic pain. It is crystal clear,
however, that the Industrial Commission considered Claimant's subjective complaints of pain, as
well as the medical findings regarding pain. See, e.g., Findings of Fact at R. p. 1I, 771 1 and 12; p.
12,114; p. 13,119; p. 14,124; p. 17,137; andp. 18, fl38-39.
Moreover, both Dr. Verst and Dr. Wiggins, as well as the IME panel, took into consideration
the Claimant's reports of pain in their impairment ratings. (R., Defs.' Ex. 3, pp. 29, 30, 34; R.,
Claimant's Ex. 6 at 2/7/07 note; R., Defendants' Ex. 6 at p. 8 ("We agree with the previously noted
impairment rating of 10% of the whole person as related to his lumbar larninectomy with residual
subjective symptoms of back and leg discomfort."). Thus, the Industrial Commission did not ignore
the issue of pain, but incorporated it into its decision finding a 25% disability. As the reports of
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physicians take into account Claimant's complaints of pain, and the Commission considered these
requests, there is substantial evidence supporting the Industrial Commission's finding.

See

Pomevinke v. Excel Trucking Transport, 124 Idaho 301,305,859 P.2d 337,341 (1993).

E.

Defendants Are Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees.
While generally attorney fees are not awardable to defendants in workers compensation

appeals, when a claimant simply requests the Supreme Court to reweigh the evidence the Court will
award fees under Rule 11.1 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. See, for instance, Talbot v. Ames
Construction, 127 Idaho at 653, 904 P.2d at 565, in which the Court imposed sanctions where in
addition to acknowledging that the record supported the findings of the Commission, the attorney's
"sole argument on appeal was an attempt to have this Court try this case anew. [The attorney]
requested this Court to examine the findings of the Commission and to reweigh the evidence and
credibility determinations of the Commission, which $his Court may not do as prescribed by the
Constitution, statute, and established precedent." Moreover, in Stolle v. Bennett, the Court also
awarded sanctions to the defendants under I.A.R. 11.1. 144 Idaho 44,51, 156 P.3d 545,552 (2007).
In that case, the Court noted that it has awarded attorney fees in the past when the appealing party is
simply asking the Court to reweigh the evidence and credibility determinations. The Court noted
that "under clear case precedent, [reweighing evidence and evaluating credibility determinations] is
not this Court's role; therefore, the appeal is frivolous and without any legitimate basis." Id.
In the instant case, the Industrial Commission set out in great detail the evidence and the
testimony it considered, set out the legal guidelines and applied the facts to come to a reasoned
conclusion. Claimant nevertheless sought reconsideration at the Industrial Commission level of the
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findings of the Commission. (R. p. 46). The Industrial Commission denied that motion, noting that
"Claimant's motion amounts to a request to reweigh evidence and arguments already considered."

(Id.,p. 62). It noted in its order denying reconsideration that it had carefully considered the evidence
and the arguments regarding the issues of permanent partial disability and permanent total disability,
and denied reconsideration as its decision was fully supported by the evidence in the record. (Id.,p.
63). The Claimant now comes before this Court making the same arguments. He has no good faith
argument for a modification of existing law and simply asks this Court, as he asked the Industrial
Commission, to reweigh the evidence considered by the Industrial Commission. He points to no
issue that the Industrial Commission overlooked. He sets out no relevant argument that the
Commission's determinations were not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Rule 11.1
sanctions are appropriate.

IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants submit that the Industrial Commission's determination that Claimant had not
carried his burden of establishing that he was disabled in excess of the 25% total disability awarded
by the Industrial Commission is correct. Claimant failed to present any substantial evidence that his
disability exceeded the amount awarded. The Industrial Commission's decision is supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
..: ,...
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Defendants respectfully request this Court to affirm the Industrial Commission's decision
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and impose sanctions on the Claimant's attorney under I.A.R. 11.1 as he is merely asking the Court
to reweigh the evidence already considered by the Industrial Commission.
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DATED this Y d a y of ~ a y2009.
,
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW &
MCKLVEEN, C M T E R E D

By^i\&n~e+-,~P/?~
Neil D. McFeeley
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caused to be served two (2) true and correct copies of the above and foregoing
DefendantsIRespondents Brief to each party in this appeal, addressed and sent by the method
indicated below:
Emil F. Pike, Jr.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
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